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Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries:
How to Incentivize Innovation*
Ann Weilbaecher"
I.. INTRODUCTION

The current approach to drug discovery is costly and time consuming.
Estimates indicate that bringing a new drug to market costs anywhere from
$115 million to over $800 million and takes approximately twelve years.'
To recoup these high costs, drug developers depend upon the willingness
and ability of consumers to purchase the resulting drugs. The patent system
provides drug developers limited exclusivity for their products. Without
these exclusive patent protections, many drug .developers would not invest
the needed funds to develop new drugs.3 Although these patent protections
are important for profitable drugs, the patent system offers less incentive for
research and development (R&D) of new drugs likely to have low profit
margins. Pharmaceutical companies and other drug developers thus have
little incentive to develop treatments for diseases endemic in developing
countries because the treatments are too expensive for the people who need
them, and the developers will be unable to recoup their significant R&D
expenditures. 4
This comment was a finalist in Epstein, Becker & Green's 11th Annual Health Law
Writing Competition.
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1. David Henry & Joel Lexchin, The PharmaceuticalIndustry as a Medicines Provider,
360 LANCET 1590, 1592-93 (2002); Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G.
Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003). All dollar amounts in this comment refer to U.S. dollars.
2. See Henry & Lexchin, supra note 1, at 1593.
3. See id.
4. Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Curesfor Tropical Diseases: Is
Open Source an Answer?, 6 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 169, 169 (2004) (This article is based
on Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is
Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLoS MED 3 (2004)), available at http://mjlst.umn.edu/pdfs/
*
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On May 24, 2008, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decisionmaking body for the World Health Organization (WHO), released a
document entitled Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property (Global Strategy).5 In Global
Strategy, WHO Member States suggest implementation strategies to
promote R&D for diseases endemic in developing countries.6 An
Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) consisting of representatives
from over twenty countries developed these strategies.7 One stated aim of
the action plan is to explore a variety of incentive mechanisms "addressing
the de-linkage of the costs of research and development and the price of
health products and methods for tailoring the optimal mix of incentives to a
particular condition or product with the objective of addressing diseases
proposed
that disproportionately affect developing countries." 8 Some of the
9
strategies include open source research, patent pools, and prizes.
On January 21, 2009, the WHO released another document entitled
"Proposed Time Frames and Estimated Funding Needs" to implement the
WHO IGWG plan of action.' 0 The total cost estimate to implement the
WHO IGWG plan of action is $2.064 billion dollars, with a proposed time
frame from 2009 to 2015."1 Annually, approximately $160 billion is spent
globally on health R&D; however, only three percent of that money is
'2
"directed at diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries."'
Under the proposed global strategy and action plan, twelve percent of
global health spending will be directed at R&D for these diseases.' 3 The
plan represents global support for a variety of strategies to incentivize
research in this much-needed area of health care.
This comment reviews three proposals identified in the Global Strategy:
open source initiatives, patent pools, and prizes. In addition, this comment
discusses an additional strategy, wild card patent extensions. Although the
mauera3.pdf [hereinafter Maurer et al., MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.].
5. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property,WHA61.21, at 1 (May 24, 2008), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/A61/A6 _R21-en.pdf.
6. Id. at 1, 6.
7. See World Health Organization [WHO], Pub. Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Prop., Expert Working Group on R&D Financing,http://www.who.int/phi/R Dfinancing/en/
index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Expert Working Group].
8. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at 10, 14, 16-17.
10. WHO, Executive Bd. 124th Session, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property: Global Strategy and Plan of Action: Proposed Time Frames and Estimated
Funding Needs 1, EB124/16 Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.who.int/gb/
ebwha/pdf files/EB 124/B 124_16Add2-en.pdf [hereinafter WHO Executive Bd.].
11. Id. at 1-2.
12. Id. at3.
13. Id.
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Global Strategy did not endorse wild card patent extensions, this alternative
represents a contrasting model that leverages the patent system to
incentivize research. Part II of this comment addresses the inadequacy of
research and development for diseases that disproportionately affect people
in developing countries. Part III analyzes how the patent system can inhibit
innovation of new drugs for these neglected diseases. Part IV discusses
possible strategies to spur drug and vaccine development including open
source, patent pools, prizes, and wild card patent extensions. Part V
concludes by suggesting that a combination of proposals identified in the
WHO Global Strategy can synergistically work together to help solve the
problem.
II. LACK OF R&D FOR DISEASES ENDEMIC IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Tropical diseases affect more than half a billion people, most of whom
live in developing countries. 14 Malaria, one of the most deadly and
widespread tropical diseases, afflicts between 300 to 500 million people and
causes an estimated 1.0 to 2.7 million deaths per year. 15 Additionally, over
fourteen million people die from infectious diseases each year, ninety
percent of whom reside in developing countries.' 6 Likewise, ninety percent
of the forty million people infected with human immunodeficiency
virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) live in the
developing world.' 7
Moreover, tuberculosis (TB) annually kills
approximately two million people, ninety-nine percent of whom are in
developing countries.
The WHO has estimated that 1.7 billion people lack access to essential
medicines. 18 Additionally, one study found that approximately ten million
children in developing countries die every year from preventable and
treatable illnesses because of inadequate access to basic treatment. 19
Maurer et al., MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH., supra note 4, at 169.
15. See PATH MALARIA VACCINE INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: PLASMODIUM FALCIPARUM
MALARIA 1 (2004), available at http://www.malariavaccine.org/files/FSPfalciparum-Sept2004_FINAL.pdf.
16. Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing WorldProblems and Barriersof Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 1
(2006); MtDECINS SANS FRONTIERES [MSF] [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], MILLIONS HAVE
A DRUG PROBLEM. THEY CAN'T GET ANY. 3 (2004), available at http://www.msf.org.hk/fs/
download/?file%5fid = 17937 [hereinafter MSF].
17. Mercurio, supra note 16, at 1; MSF, supra note 16, at 7.
18. WHO, THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, at 61 (2004), available at
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/ReportsWorldMedicines_Situation.pdf.
19. See Robert E. Black et al., Where and Why are 10 Million Children Dying Every
Year?, 361 LANCET 2226, 2226 (2003); see also Teresa Cerojano, Charity: 10 Million
Children Die Without Basic Health Care, J.INQUIRER (Manchester, Conn.), May 6, 2008, at
14.
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The WHO's Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public
Health (CIPIH) classifies diseases into three categories: Type I diseases,
Type II diseases, and Type III diseases. 20 Type I diseases occur in both
developed and undeveloped countries and include communicable diseases
(i.e., hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenzae type b) and noncommunicable diseases (i.e., diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and tobaccorelated diseases). 2 1 Type II diseases occur in both wealthy and poor
countries, but they are proportionally higher in poor countries.22 Type II
diseases, which the WHO has classified as "neglected diseases," include
communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and TB. 23 Type III diseases,
which encompass infectious diseases, such as malaria, trypanosomiasis
(African sleeping sickness), and onchocerciasis (African river blindness),
overwhelmingly or exclusively occur in developing countries.24 The WHO
considers Type III diseases "very neglected diseases. 25 Public health
scholars James Love and Tim Hubbard have emphasized that "under a
system of incentives that targets prices (and incomes of patients), there is
considerable under-investment in Type II and III diseases relative to need
when measured on medical and social grounds. 26
Around the world, research resources applied to health problems in
developing countries contrast sharply with the preventable disease burden
represented in those countries. Some scholars have termed this the
"research and development gap" (R&D gap).27 The Commission on Health
Research for Development first identified this research gap in 1990.28 The
Commission later termed this the "10/90 gap," finding that less than ten
percent of global health R&D is spent on health problems in poor countries,
which account for over ninety percent of the global disease burden. 29 The
severe imbalance between the magnitude of Type II and Type III diseases
Nat'l.
WHO, PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT
20.
OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

12-13 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/

ENPublicHealthReport.pdf [hereinafter

REPORT OF THE CIPIH].

21. Id. at 13.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2007); see also REPORT OF THE CIPIH, supra
note 20, at 16-17.
27. Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations,20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1037 (2005).
28. GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH
2003-2004 35 (2004).
29. Id.
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and the amount spent on R&D persists today.3 °
III. PATENT SYSTEM INHIBITING R&D
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries both rely on the patent
system for protection of their developed products. 31 Most drugs easily can
be reverse engineered.32 Therefore, without the guarantee of limited
exclusivity offered by drug patents, most pharmaceutical companies would
have little incentive to invest the amount of money needed to bring a new
drug to market.3 3 The same patent protections that incentivize research for
profit-making drugs can foreclose R&D for necessary, albeit unprofitable,
drugs, vaccines, and products. Love and Hubbard note, "[w]hen marketing
exclusivity is the reward, investors rationally target research investments to
address the problems of patients who have the highest incomes and can pay
the highest prices. 34
Additionally, the profusion of patents can create problems for
downstream research in the form of "anticommons" and "patent thickets. 35
When the number of patent rights interferes with the development and
marketing of new products, this is referred to as an "anticommons
problem., 36 A "pure" anticommons problem exists when "multiple, nonoverlapping rights must be obtained in order to develop an additional nonoverlapping right. 3 7 A patent thicket, by contrast, exists when there are
many overlapping patent claims on different aspects of biotechnology
products.38 Patents often state broader claims than the actual developed
product; consequently, many patents may cover the same area.
Accordingly, multiple patentees can lay claim to the same area of
biotechnology.40 When this occurs, researchers must obtain rights from
each patent holder within the patent thicket prior to proceeding

30. Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient
Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188-94 (2002) (finding that of
the 1,393 new drugs approved between 1975 and 1999, only 16 were indicated for tropical
diseases and tuberculosis, diseases which predominantly affect the developing world).
31. Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to Address the Access
& Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 271, 276 (2007).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Love & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 1527.
35. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 31, at 276.
36. Id. at 277; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998).
37. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 31, at 277.
38. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1614 (2003).
39. See id
40. See id.
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independently with their research.4 1
Many researchers investigating diseases endemic in developing countries
do not have the resources to assume the high transaction costs associated
with anticommons and patent thickets.42 Thus, some researchers forgo
investigating areas where the necessary patent rights are "held by multiple
parties who are difficult to locate and may be reluctant to bargain with a
downstream inventor. 'A3 Moreover, to protect their interests and to prevent
competition, patent owners may not want to license their patented products
even if they do not anticipate conducting further research on those
products.44 One scholar has contended that highly fragmented patent rights,
coupled with restrictive legislative and university policies in the life
create a "perfect storm of innovation destroying transaction
sciences,
45
costs.",

Therefore, the problem of patents foreclosing research on diseases
disproportionately affecting developing countries is twofold: (1) patents
inhibit R&D because the market drives drug development and the limited
exclusivity on the resulting drugs does not incentivize research for drugs
with low profit margins; and (2) navigating the anticommons and patent
thicket problems can be prohibitively costly and time-consuming. This
comment will outline several strategies to combat these problems.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE LACK OF ACCESS AND INNOVATION

A. Open Source
"Open source" refers to collaborative, community-based initiatives
where the components of the project are made available to all and can be
modified by all, such that individual members re-contribute to the larger
project.4 6 Open source has been lauded as a successful approach to
software development.4 7 The Linux operating system (Linux) is perhaps the
best-known and most impressive example. 8 Linux was produced by a
group of volunteers collaborating through the Internet.49 The "source code"
was made freely available for anyone to view, modify, or improve with the
41. See id.
42. See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 31, at 278.
43. See id.
44. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 38, at 1614.
45. Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-BasedOpen Science, 59 ME. L.
REV. 339, 355 (2007).
46. Thomas B. Kepler et al., Open Source Research-The Power of Us, 59 AusTL. J.
CHEMISTRY 291, 291 (2006).
47. An Open-Source Shot in the Arm?, ECONOMIST, June 12, 2004, at 17.
48. Id.
49. Id
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provision that the volunteers agreed to share their modifications openly.5 °
The participants in open source initiatives are mostly unpaid volunteers
who "donate their time and expertise for the satisfaction of contributing to
the solution of a large, complex problem and peer-recognition for having
done so." 51 Open source's primary benefit is "to cross-fertilize minds and
tap creativity quickly, cheaply and on a scale that is beyond the reach of
scientists working in the 'ivory towers' of academia or behind the
'corporate moats' of industry. 52
There are several significant obstacles to applying an open source model
to R&D for pharmaceuticals due to the fundamental differences between
software and drug development. 53 First, the costs between developing
software and drugs differ to an extraordinary extent. 54 Open source
software simply requires a laptop computer and an Internet connection,
whereas the laboratory expenses and clinical trials involved in developing a
new drug can cost over $800 million.5
Second, software development does not include a discovery phase that
compares to pharmaceutical research.5 6 Programmers immediately begin
developing source code and make steady progress; in contrast, the
discovery of target compounds to develop a new drug can take years or
decades, without knowledge at the outset-of whether the target compound
will generate rewarding results.57 Third, software development-spans-few
disciplines, whereas drug development requires coordination among
multiple specialties.58 Fourth, unlike software, the U.S. federal government
highly regulates drug development and requires Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval. 59 Finally, different intellectual property
laws regulate the software and pharmaceutical industries.60 Copyrights that
"arise automatically as code is written" protect software, whereas patents,
which may have a costly application process and are subject to more
stringent legal standards, protect drug research. 6'
Despite these differences, precedent exists for using open source ideas in
Id.
Kepler et al., supra note 46, at 291.
Bernard Munos, Can Open-Source R&D Reinvigorate Drug Research?, 5 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 723, 723 (2006), available at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journaU/
v5/n9/pdf/nrd2131 .pdf.
53. Id. at 724.
54. See id.
55. Id.; Henry & Lexchin, supra note 1, at 1593.
56. Munos, supra note 52, at 724.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
50.
51.
52.
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biomedical research.62 In this context, open source refers to the "open
origin of contributors. 6 3 The international effort to sequence the human
genome, known as the Human Genome Project, resembled an open source
initiative by placing all of the resulting data in the public domain rather than
allowing any individual researcher to patent the results.64 The primary
distinction is that the Human Genome Project involved extensive
government "top-down" involvement, whereas an open source software
project involves "bottom-up" organization among volunteers and
researchers.6 5 Open source approaches also have been used in the field of
bioinformatics, where supercomputers are used to conduct biological
research.66 The public shares the software code and databases.6 7
Although the open source approach appears to work well in precompetitive platform technologies such as biological research tools, the
question remains as to whether it will also work "further downstream,
development costs are greater and the
closer to the patient, where the
68
potential benefits more direct."
While drug developers may be unwilling to participate in open source
initiatives for the development of potentially highly profitable or
blockbuster drugs, open source may not meet resistance and may be
effective in two areas. 69 One is in the development of non-patentable
compounds or drugs whose patents have expired.7 ° Since discovery
involving these drugs and compounds cannot be protected, nor can they
garner large profits, developers generally are less interested in pursuing
research in these areas. 7 1 The second is in the area of neglected diseases
because there is not a large enough market of paying customers to justify
the expense involved in developing a new drug.7 2
Given that
pharmaceutical companies and other drug developers would not lose money
by participating in open source projects in these areas, they may be
amenable to this system.
The WHO called for support of open source initiatives in its May 2008
Global
Strategy
proposal
with
the
following
provision:

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Munos, supra note 52, at 724.
Id. at 723.
See An Open-Source Shot in the Arm?, supra note 47, at 17, 19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
See id.
An Open-Source Shot in the Arm?, supra note 47, at 17.
1d.
Id.
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(2.2) promoting upstream research and product
developing countries

development

in

(a) support discovery science, including where feasible and
appropriate, voluntary open-source methods, in order to develop a
sustainable portfolio of new products
(b) promote and improve accessibility to compound libraries
through voluntary means, provide technical support to developing
countries and promote access to drug leads identified through the
screening of compound libraries
73

Due to the international diversity of the WHO representatives who
developed this document, this proposal represents global support for open
source initiatives in the realm of treatment for neglected diseases.
1. The Tropical Disease Initiative
Stephen Mauer, Arti Rai, and Andrej Sali argue for an open source
74
approach for developing drugs to fight tropical diseases such as malaria.
An example of a promising open source approach is the Tropical Disease
75
Initiative (TDI), a decentralized, internet-based, community-wide effort.
Through TDI, scientists from laboratories, universities, institutes, and
corporations can collaborate to mine data from multiple sources to obtain
promising leads on drug compounds for specific diseases.76 The authors
describe an open source drug discovery in the following manner:
As with current software collaborations, we propose a Web site where
volunteers use a variety of computer programs, databases, and computing
hardware []. Individual pages would host tasks like searching for new
protein targets, finding chemicals to attack known targets, and posting
data from related chemistry and biology experiments. Volunteers could
use chat rooms and bulletin boards to announce discoveries and debate
future research directions. Over time,
the most dedicated and proficient
77
volunteers would become leaders.
The authors further explain that new lead compounds can be identified

73. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 5, at 10.
74. Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, FindingCuresfor TropicalDiseases: Is
Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLoS MED., 183, 183 (2004) [hereinafter Maurer et al., PLoS
MED.].

75. Id.
76. See id
77. Id. at 184.
Published by LAW eCommons, 2009
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using computation alone - an impossibility just ten years ago.78 Therefore,
there will be incentives for graduate students and young professionals to
volunteer and gain experience, or to enhance their professional reputations.
This is one of many approaches that uses elements of the open source
software-development model in drug research.79 Professor Yochai Benkler,
of Yale Law School, contends that this model can exploit the "'excess
capacity' of graduate students and university labs, much as students and
80
academics also contribute to open-source software development."
Under the TDI model, "Virtual Pharmas" could competitively bid for the
lead components. 8 ' In the Virtual Pharmas approach, teams funded by
governments and philanthropies search for promising private and academic
research on new drug compounds.82 Virtual Pharmas do not perform the
actual R&D (from a promising compound to a marketable drug), instead
they award the bid for promising drug candidates to a laboratory based on a
competitive bidding process.8 3 TDI would help Virtual Pharmas contain the
costs of discovering, developing, and manufacturing drugs by finding
promising target compounds.8 4 Moreover, the open source drugs would not
be patented; rather, the drug itself would enter the public domain for
generic manufacturers to produce. 85 This helps achieve the goal of bringing
86
new medicines to people who need them, at the lowest possible price.
Finding promising lead compounds is especially important because it
takes up to approximately twelve years to develop a new drug.87 Moreover,
many pharmaceutical companies and research laboratories can spend years
developing a potential drug that proves unsuccessful. Using open source, a
team of scientists collaborate and explore all the existing literature to find
the most promising leads, which could prevent years of research on less
promising compounds, allowing Virtual Pharmas to help contain costs in
discovering, developing, and manufacturing drugs.88
2. The Synaptic Leap
Recently, an open source collaboration investigating tropical diseases

78.
79.

Id
An Open-Source Shot in the Arm?, supra note 47, at 18.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id
See Maurer et al., PLOS MED., supranote 74, at 184.
Id.at 183.
Id.at 183-84.
Id.at 184.
Id.

86.
87.
88.

See id.
Henry & Lexchin, supra note 1, at 1592.
Maurer et al., PLoS MED., supra note 74, at 184.
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was described in the AustralianJournalof Chemistry.89 The Synaptic Leap
(TSL) is an open source biomedical research community that aims to
investigate diseases where "profit-driven research is failing." 90 TSL is
collaborating with TDI to research malaria and schistosomiasis, one of the
most serious tropical diseases. 91 This joint, open source initiative employs
both "armchair and wet-laboratory modes" and contributors may post
comments on the internet to suggest possible routes to the drugs studied, to
propose suitable reactions, or to share their experiences on suggested
chemical steps.92 Those with laboratory access can "attempt reactions of
interest and post results, either as part of spare-time activities or as more
formal student projects. 93 The authors note, "[o]pen source communities
thus expand the borders of what is already commonplace within chemistry
schools."94
3. Open Source Drug Discovery
In addition, an open source initiative called Open Source Drug Discovery
(OSDD) is currently under way in India through the Council of Scientific
and Industrial Research (CSIR).95 Samir Brahmachari, director general of

the CSIR, states that the goal of OSDD is "to establish a novel web-enabled
open source platform-both computational and experimental-to make
drug discovery cost effective and affordable by utilising the creative
potential of college and university students along with senior scientists, a
collective approach to drug development. 96 The project will receive onethird of its funding from the government, one-third from international
sources, and one-third from philanthropic organizations.9 7 The Indian
government already has committed the equivalent of $38 million to
OSDD.98

89. Kepler et al., supra note 46, at 293.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Seema Singh, India Takes an Open Source Approach to Drug Discovery, 133 CELL,
201, 201 (2008).
96. The Rediff Interview with Samir K. Brahmachari, Director, CSIR, Open Source
Drug Discovery Will Lower Costs, Rediff.com, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/
money/2008/feb/1 5inter.htm.
97. Soma Banerjee & Gireesh Chandra Prasad, Govt to Rope in Young Minds to Invent
Cheaper Drugs, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/Pharmaceuticals/Govt torope inyoungminds to inventcheaper drugs/articleshow
/2635842.cms.
98. Open Source Drug Discovery, http://www.osdd.net/what-is-osdd.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009).
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OSDD has created a database of requirements for infectious disease drug
development, whereby individual researchers can contribute to solutions for
specific aspects of drug discovery. 99 "The chemical entities thus developed
will instantly become generics as the knowledge will be in public domain.
This is diametrically opposite to the concept of intellectual property
protection, which involves legal expenses to bar others from applying their
minds on the invention,"
Mr. Brahmachari said in an interview with The
00
Economic Times.'
While an open source initiative is a strategy largely outside of the patent
system, this comment will next address a strategy within the patent system,
namely, the collective management of intellectual property rights through
patent pools.
B. Patent Pools
The WHO, UNITAID, and pharmaceutical
companies like
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) have recommended patent pools as a potentially
effective means to promote innovation and access to medicines to target
diseases endemic in developing countries.1° 1 A patent pool is defined as:
An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate (pool)
their patents and to license them to one another or to third parties. Pools
usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees and allocate a portion
of the licensing fees 0(royalties)
to patent owners according to a pre-set
2
formula or procedure.1
Agreements between the members of the patent pool and third parties
can be established directly through patentees and licensees or indirectly

99. Banerjee & Prasad, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. See WHO, Regional Office for South-East Asia, Briefing Note: Medical
Innovation, Innovation for Diseases That Mainly Affect Developing Countries: Issues and
Ideas, at
3 (Oct.
2007),
available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/
AIDSInnovationOctO7.pdf [hereinafter WHO, Innovation for Diseases]; Press Release,
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), UAEM Urges Universities to Support
UNITAID Patent Pool (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.essentialmedicine.org/uaem-urgesuniversities-to-support-unitaid-patent-pool/; Press Release, Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, MSF
Statement on UNITAID Medicines Patent Pool Decision (July 9, 2008),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=2843 [hereinafter MSF Press
Release]; Sarah Boseley, Drug Giants Urged to Create Patent Pools, GUARDIAN, Mar. 24,
2009, at 5, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/mar/24/pharamcuticalspatent-pools-hiv-drugs.
102. KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, IGWG BRIEFING PAPER ON PATENT POOLS:
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - THE USE OF PATENT POOLS TO
EXPAND
ACCESS ESSENTIAL MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2007), available at

http://www.keionline.org/content/view/65/ [hereinafter KEI].
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through an entity specifically created to administer the pool.' °3 This type of
collective management strategy can be voluntary or governmentallyimposed. 10 4 Patent pools can accelerate innovation by removing problems
associated with "blocking" patents, reducing transaction costs, and
streamlining and centralizing licensing procedures, thereby making it
quicker and simpler to obtain licenses. 0 5 According to James Love,
"[i]ncreased use of patent pools and collective management of IP
[intellectual property] rights can foster access to patented medicines and
improve the traditional patent system. This collective
management will
10 6
streamline patent procedures globally and lower costs.'
Precedents for patent pools in the United States began as early as the
mid-nineteenth century. 10 7 In 1856, the Sewing Machine Combination
patent pool was formed, which was comprised of sewing machine
patents. 10 8 In 1917, an aircraft patent pool was formed, Manufacturer's
Aircraft Association (MAA), which included almost every aircraft
manufacturer in the U.S. 10 9 The U.S. government considered development
of the MAA crucial because two aircraft patent holders, the Wright
Company and the Curtiss Company, blocked the building of new airplanes
just as the United States was entering World War 1.110 Indeed, the MAA
was created when the government threatened to compulsorily license the
needed patented technology."' Patent pools also have been used in the
electronics and telecommunications industries for development of
technology such as radio, DVD-video, DVD-Rom, and MPEG_2
2
compression technology."
However, critics of patent pools caution that patent pools could have
anti-competitive effects." 3 These critics argue that patent pools cover
competitive alternatives to certain technologies that can expand monopoly
pricing.' 14 In 1912, in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United

103.

Birgit Verbeure et al., Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing, 24

TRENDS

BIOTECHNOLOGY 115, 115 (2006).

104. WHO, Innovationfor Diseases, supra note 101, at 2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, and New
Methods of Stimulating MedicalR & D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 679, 694 (2007).
107. JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. KEI, supra note 102, at 2.
112. Id.
113. Clark, supra note 108, at 10.
114. Id.
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States, the U.S. Supreme Court dissolved a patent pool because of antitrust
violations,
including
fixing
prices and
blocking unlicensed
5
manufacturers.'" In 1945, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court dissolved a glass manufacturer patent pool because it
comprised ninety-four percent of all glass made in the U.S. and was thus
able to set and maintain unreasonably high glass prices.' 16 In an attempt to
deal with potential anticompetitive effects of patent pools, the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued Antitrust
Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intellectual Property in 1995.117 Although
these guidelines specify how patent pools can be deemed anticompetitive,
they also indicate that patent pools "may provide procompetitive benefits
by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs,
' 8
clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.""
The European Commission and Japanese Fair Trade Commission also have
issued guidelines outlining procedures to manage any potential
anticompetitive effects of patent pools." 19
While there are significant precedents for patent pools in the electronics
and telecommunications industries, patent pools largely have been untested
in biotechnology, and some analysts question whether patent pools can be
applied effectively to the medical biotechnology industry. 20
The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) called2
for further study into the use of patent pools in the field of biotechnology.' 1
The OECD was concerned that "the fact that biotechnology companies rely
heavily on their intellectual property (IP) and foster what has been called a
'bunker mentality' might cause difficulties in the process of creating a
pool.'

22

The WHO also called for research into the feasibility of patent

pools in its Global Strategy proposal in the following provision:
(4.3) developing possible new mechanisms to promote transfer of and
access to key health-related technologies
(a) examine the feasibility of voluntary patent pools of upstream and
115.
116.

Id. at5.
Id.

117. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (1995), available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/

public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
118. Id.at28.
119. Verbeure et al., supranote 103, at 115-16.
120. Id. at 117; Patrick Gaul, Towards PatentPools in Biotechnology?, 2

INNOVATION

STRATEGY TODAY 123, 123 (2006), available at http://www.biodevelopments.org/
innovation/ist5.pdf; Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., Models for FacilitatingAccess to Patents
on Genetic Inventions, 7 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 143, 145 (2006).
121. Overwalle et al., supra note 120.
122. Id.
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downstream technologies to promote innovation of and access to
health products and medical devices .... 123
One precedent for patent pools exists in the field of agricultural
biotechnology-the Golden Rice case. 124 In this case, private and public
corporations worked together to create a non-profit, humanitarian patent
pool. 125 The private company, Potrykus, wanted to transfer its geneticallyenriched rice grains, Golden Rice, to developing countries for breeding;
however, thirty-two different companies and universities had seventy
patents in Golden Rice, precluding the transfer.126 Potrykus approached six
key patent holders, who agreed to give Potrykus permission to grant free
licenses to developing countries with a right to sub-license.' 27 A voluntary
humanitarian board, HumBo, was established to aid in the governance of
the patent pool. 128 This case received much attention as an example of
private-public collaboration in negotiating through patent thickets to reach a
humanitarian end. 129 The following examples demonstrate how the
collaborative approach of patent pools that was exhibited in the Golden
Rice case can be applied to R&D for drugs and vaccines that combat
specific diseases.
1. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Patent Pool Proposal
In 2005, the Bulletin of the World Health Organization put forth a
proposal to create a patent pool to facilitate the development of a vaccine
The proposal
for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 130
numerous
SARS
in
late
2002,
contended that since the outbreak of
organizations have filed patent applications that incorporate the genomic
sequence of the SARS coronavirus, which likely would result in a
fragmentation of intellectual property rights and thus hinder the
development of a vaccine. 131 A patent pool was recommended to help set a
precedent for the use of patent pools in health care. 132 This proposal has yet
to be adopted.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 5, at 14.
Verbeure et al., supra note 103, at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Overwalle et al., supra note 120, at 145.
James H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

Intellectual Property Rights: The PossibleRole of Patent Pooling,83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH

ORG. 707, 707 (2005), availableat http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 708.
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2. Malaria Vaccine Patent Pool Proposal
The promises and challenges of a patent pool approach for the
development of a malaria vaccine was analyzed in a study published in
2007 in the Intellectual Property Handbook for Best Practices.33 The
authors of the study note that no safe malaria vaccine currently exists, and
the vaccine is an increasing priority as malaria parasites are becoming
resistant to known drug treatments.134 A malaria vaccine could have the
following benefits in comparison with the existing treatments: (1) costeffectiveness; (2) minimization of negative effects on the environment by
reducing the need for pesticides to control mosquito populations; (3)
and (4) the
assistance in solving the problem of drug-resistant parasites;
1 35
potential to save lives, which is of the utmost importance.
Developing and commercializing a malaria vaccine, however, presents
significant economic, technical, and intellectual property challenges.
Although there is a profound need for a malaria vaccine, a profitable market
36
that would incentivize a sustained source of funding does not exist.'
However, a number of philanthropic, public, and private initiatives fund
R&D for a malaria vaccine. 137 The largest contributor by far is the Bill &
has spent $1.2 billion to further its stated
Melinda Gates Foundation, which
38
goal of eradicating malaria. 1
Technically, the development an effective vaccine poses a number of
challenges. Malaria results from different parasite species in different
139
countries, and there are numerous variants within each parasite species.
The malaria parasite produces many different antigens during each stage of
its life cycle. 140 Antigens are "substances that can evoke an immune
vaccine.' 4'
response in humans" and can be useful in developing a
Although several thousand potential target antigens could lead to potential
vaccines, researches have only studied "a few dozen" of these antigens for

133.

Sandra L. Shotwell, Patent Consolidation and EquitableAccess: PATH's Malaria

Vaccines, in

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

IN HEALTH

AND AGRICULTURAL

INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1789, 1789 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds.,

2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/resources-and-tools/Publications/
links/ipHandbook%20Volume%202.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1789-90.
138. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Eradicate Malaria? Doubters Fuel Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at Fl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/health/
04mala.html?ref health.
139. Shotwell, supra note 133, at 1790.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
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use in potential vaccines. 142 In 2006, sixteen vaccine candidates were being
investigated in clinical trials globally. 143 Recently, the first malaria vaccine
has been effective in Phase 2 clinical trials in Africa. 44 Although several
malaria vaccines are undergoing analysis in human clinical trials in Africa,
Asia, Europe, and the United States, it could be ten years before an 1effective
45
vaccine achieves regulatory approval and is licensed and produced.
Additionally, there are a number of significant intellectual property
challenges to developing a malaria vaccine. Many antigens needed for
vaccine development are covered by multiple patents, some of which have
overlapping claims, creating a patent thicket. 146 Such a patent thicket can
prove a forbidding obstacle, given that more than one antigen is usually
needed to develop an effective vaccine. 147 For instance, a recent study
found one malaria antigen that could be targeted for a vaccine is subject to
thirty-four patents. 48 Gaining access to patents one at a time through
traditional licensing and partnering utilizes much needed time and resources
149
that could otherwise be used to develop and deliver the vaccines.
Further, the negotiations needed to acquire access to needed patents could
cause additional delays.15 0 Access to key patents could be thwarted if the
patent owner is unwilling to license to others, thus blocking access to the
antigen. 151
A patent pool could help solve many of these problems, allowing access
to multiple antigens, simplifying licensing transactions, and lowering the
transaction costs associated with navigating through a patent thicket.
However, the 2007 study published in the Intellectual Property Handbook
concluded that a patent pool for existing malaria-antigens would be ill
advised, due to the high costs of starting a pool, the difficulty engaging the
current patent holders to contribute to the pool, and the likelihood that only
a few entities would be interested in accessing any particular malariaantigen patent. 152 The main obstacle is that almost all of the malariaantigen patents currently are assigned or exclusively licensed to private

142. Id.
143. PATH Malaria Vaccine Initiative, http://www.malariavaccine.org/malvac-state-ofvaccine-dev.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
144. Shotwell, supra note 133 at 1790.
145.

PATH MALARIA VACCINE INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: PLASMODiUM FALCIPARUM

http://www.malariavaccine.org/files/FSPfalciparum-Sept-2004_FINAL.pdf (last
visited Apr. 7, 2009).
146. Shotwell, supra note 133, at 1790.
147. Id.
148. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 31, at 272.
149. Shotwell, supra note 133, at 1790.
150. Id. at 1790-91.
151. Id. at 1791.
152. Id. at 1794-95.
MALARIA,
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companies and are not available for licensing from the original publicly
funded institution. 53 However, the study suggests "the concept of a
or patent pool may still be useful for patents to be filed in
technology ' 15trust
4
the future."

3. GSK Patent Pool for Neglected Tropical Diseases
Indeed, encouraging patent holders, particularly private companies, to
contribute voluntarily to the pool is a large barrier with regard to the
feasibility of biotechnology patent pools.'

55

However, the tides may be

turning in terms of garnering private company interest in voluntary patent
pools for drug and vaccine development. Nature recently reported that
"pharmaceutical giant" GSK has agreed to participate in a voluntary patent
pool to allow access to intellectual property relevant to neglected tropical
diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.156 Under the proposal,
"[r]esearchers and companies, including manufacturers of generic drugs,
would be able to license participants' patents from the pool for free to
develop new treatments for neglected diseases in the world's [fifty] leasthas agreed to place 500 patents and
developed countries (LCDs)."' 157 GSK 58
300 pending applications into the pool.

4. UNITAID Patent Pool Proposal for Pediatric AIDS Drugs
Moreover, UNITAID, an international agency created in 2006 by Brazil,
Britain, Chile, France, Norway, and other countries to buy medicines to
combat AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, recently announced a proposal to
establish a patent pool for medicines. 159 Three private companies, Gilead,
160
Johnson & Johnson, and Merck, have agreed to negotiate with UNITAID.
The UNITAID patent pool initially will focus on pediatric AIDS drugs and
6'
drugs developed for adults who are resistant to first-line AIDS drugs.'
Unlike first-line AIDS drugs, whose patents have expired and are available
inexpensively from generic manufacturers, pediatric and second-line AIDS
153.
154.

Id. at 1794.
Id. at 1795.

See Shotwell, supra note 133, at 1791; MSF Press Release, supra note 101.
GSK Backs PatentPoolfor Neglected Diseases,457 NATURE 949, 949 (2009).
157. Drug Patent Plan Gets Mixed Reviews, 457 NATURE 1064, 1064 (2009).
158. Drug PatentPools Start to Take Shape, 458 NATURE 562, 562 (2009).
159. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Effort for Lower Drug Prices Would Focus on Gaining
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at F6.
160. Posting of James Love to Knowledge Ecology Notes: The KEI Staff Blog, KEI
Reaction to GSK Announcement on Patent Pool for Neglected Diseases,
http://www.keionline.orgblogs/2009/02/19/gsk-patent-pool/ (Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
Love, Knowledge Ecology Notes].
161. McNeil, Jr., supra note 159.
155.

156.
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drugs largely are still covered by existing patents. 62
The UNITAID and GSK proposals could set a precedent for the use of
patent pools in the biomedical field, specifically for drug and vaccine
development.
Mddecins Sans Frontires (Doctors Without Borders)
strongly endorsed the UNITAID patent pool proposal as a visionary first
step in providing increased access to lower-priced medicines. 63 The
Director of Policy at Mddecins Sans Fronti~res' Access Campaign, Ellen 't
Hoen, stated, "[w]hether this works or not now depends on the willingness
of patent holders to share, in exchange for royalties, the relevant patent
rights in the pool."' 64
Prizes are another strategy for incentivizing research in unprofitable (but
socially valuable) fields and can be used in tandem with strategies such as
open source initiatives and patent pools.
C. Prizes
As a recent article in Slate suggested, prizes are not a new concept:
"[o]ver the past few centuries, prizes have been designated for a longitudemeasuring device (announced 1714, for up to 20,000 British pounds), a
nonstop flight from New York to Paris (announced 1919, for $25,000;
eventually awarded to Charles Lindbergh), and private space travel
(announced 1996, the $10 million X-Prize)."' 165 In the past year, politicians,
scholars, and socially-conscious entrepreneurs, such as U.S. Senator
Bernard Sanders, Senator John Edwards, Senator Lindsey Graham,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former speaker of the house Newt
Gingrich, and Nobel laureate Joseph 66Stiglitz have suggested prizes for
medical and environmental inventions.1
Love and Hubbard recommend prize systems that reward based on the
impact of the inventions on healthcare. 167 They suggest:
The reward system could be more rational than the existing system,
allocating greater rewards for innovative products and less for 'me too'
products that do not work better than existing products. Premiums could
be given for therapies that address treatment
gaps or for inventions that
68
pave the way to new classes of drugs.'

162.

Id.

163.

MSF Press Release, supra note 101.

164.

Id.

165. Catherine Rampell, Invent a Drug, Win $1 Million: Should the Government Start
Handing Out Prizes for Science Breakthroughs?, SLATE, Jan. 23, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2182663/.
166. Id.
167. Love & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 1529.
168. Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Frameworkfor Global Healthcare
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The prize system is a unique alternative to the patent market monopoly
system as an incentive for private investment. 169 Love and Hubbard assert,
"[t]he elimination of marketing monopolies, the de-coupling of R&D
incentives from prices, and the creation of an evidence-based reward system
linked to changes in health outcomes will lead to significant reductions in
to market products, the area of the largest waste in the current
expenditures
' 170
system."
1. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2005 and 2007
In 2005, U.S. Representative (now Senator) Bernard Sanders proposed
the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2005, which was based upon the
principles espoused by Love and Hubbard.171 According to Love and
Hubbard:
[The Medical Innovation Prize Fund of 2005] does not do away with the
patent system. Innovators can still get patents[] and use patents to protect
inventions, up until the point when a product is registered for sale. At
that point, however, rewards for the invention from the prize fund replace
the exclusive rights of patent as the incentive mechanism. In effect, it
changes the way the patent system
172 works and provides a new system of
intellectual property incentives.
Two years later, Senator Sanders reintroduced the bill as the Medical
Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2007 to offer "prize payments for medical
innovation relating to a drug, a biological product, or a new manufacturing
process for a drug or biological product. '' 173 The proposed management
structure consists of a thirteen member board of trustees; including the
Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs; the Director of the National Institutes of
Health; the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and
nine individuals appointed by the President representing the business sector,
the private medical research and development sector, and consumer and
patient interests. 174 The Board administers the prizes, with the amounts
based upon the following criteria: (1) the number of patients who benefit
from the innovation; (2) the incremental therapeutic benefit of the
innovation; (3) the degree to which the innovation addresses priority health
R&D, 2 PLoS BIOLOGY 147, 149 (2004), available at http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/
1545-7885/2/2/pdf/10. 1371_1545-7885 2 2 complete.pdf.
169. Love & Hubbard, supranote 26, at 1553.
170. Id. at 1554.
171. Id. at 1532; Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005).
172. Love & Hubbard, supra note 26, at 1532.
173. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 9(a) (2007).
174. Id. § 7(b).
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care needs, including emerging global infectious diseases, orphan diseases,
and neglected diseases that predominantly afflict developing countries; and
(4) efficiency improvements in manufacturing processes for drugs or
biological processes. 75 The proposed budget for the prize fund each year 1is
76
0.6% of the U.S. gross domestic product for the preceding fiscal year.
The legislation was not adopted, but it represents the most comprehensive,
evidence-based prize legislation linked to changes in health outcomes and
priority healthcare needs proposed in the United States.
2. Privately-Sponsored Medical Innovation Prizes
Numerous private, philanthropic organizations have sponsored medical
innovation prizes such as the Gotham Prize for Cancer Research (created by
two hedge fund managers and two professors), the X-Prize Foundation
(started by a physician), Prize4 Life (founded by a group of Harvard
Business School students), and InnoCentive (created by pharmaceutical
company, Eli Lilly). 77 For instance, Prize4Life initially posted challenges
to anyone who could find a biomarker to track the progression of
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) in 2006.178 In May 2007, Prize4Life
awarded $15,000 for each of the five best theoretical proposals
submitted. 7 9 Further, in April 2009, Prize4Life gave $100,000 in prize
money to two InnoCentive "Solvers" for their contributions to biomarkers
for measuring disease progression in ALS. 180
3. Prizes and Patent Pools
A novel idea for incentivizing private companies to participate in patent
pools has been a combined prize fund/patent pool model, whereby entities
that license patents to a patent pool are rewarded with a prize fund.' 8' The
WHO endorsed the use of prizes as an incentive for R&D for diseases that
175.

Id. § 9(c).

176. Id. § 15(a)(2).
177. Elizabeth Bernstein, Gotham Prize Honors New Cancer Research, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 1, 2008, D3; Steve LeVine, The XFactor: Can Big Money Contests Save Innovation?,
Bus. WK., Dec. 1, 2008, at 54; Press Release, Prize4Life, Prize4Life Awards Prizes for ALS
Biomarker Challenge to InnoCentive Solvers (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.prize4life.org/uploaded files/prize4lifejpressrelease v13 ccaNrc.pdf
[hereinafter Prize4Life Press Release]; InnoCentive FAQ, http://www.innocentive.com/
crowd-sourcing-news/faq/#What%20is%20InnoCentive.
178. Prize4Life, http://www.prize4life.org/page/prizes/biomarkerprize (last visited
Apr. 4, 2009).
179. Id.
180. Prize4Life Press Release, supra note 177. InnoCentive "Solvers" are individuals or
organizations who register with InnoCentive to solve InnoCentive Challenges. InnoCentive
FAQ, supra note 177.
181. Love, Knowledge Ecology Notes, supra note 160.
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disproportionately affect developing countries in the following provision of
its Global Strategy proposal:
(5.3) exploring and, where appropriate, promoting possible incentive
schemes for research and development on Type II and Type III diseases
and on developing countries' specific research and development needs in
relation to Type I diseases
(a) explore and, where appropriate, promote a range of incentive
schemes for research and development including addressing, where
appropriate, the de-linkage of the costs of research and development
and the price of health products, for example through the award of
prizes, with the objective of addressing diseases which
disproportionately affect developing countries
182

Furthering this endorsement of prizes, the governments of Barbados and
Bolivia suggested a linked prize fund/patent pool proposal as one
alternative when they presented to the WHO Expert Group on R&D
Financing in April 2008.183
While the governments submitted six
alternatives overall, Proposal 5, "Licensed Products Prize Fund for
Donors," represents a linked patent pool/prize fund. 18 4 In this proposal,
developers who voluntarily license innovations to a patent pool for HIVAIDS, TB, and malaria will be rewarded with cash prizes.1 85 The amount
of the prize awarded is based on the relative impact of the products on
health outcomes. 186 Moreover, the private companies Gilead and Johnson &
Johnson also have expressed a willingness to support such a combined
proposal. 187
4. Prizes and Open Source Initiatives
Likewise, prizes can incentivize participation in open source initiatives.
An example is the model proposed by OSDD: any scientist who contributes
a novel idea, such as posting a new algorithm or information on a new
target drug, will receive microcredits, and when a certain number of
microcredits have been accrued, the scientist will receive a monetary
182. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 5, at 16-17.
183. Id.; see Barbados & Bolivia Submissions to WHO IGWG, Working Document Barbados and Bolivia: Proposal 5: A Licensed Products Prize Fund (LD/pf) for Donors (Apr.
2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b-b-igwg/prop5_donor-drugsprizes.pdf [hereinafter
Proposal 5].
184. Proposal 5, supra note 183, at 1.
185. Id. at 2.
186. Id.
187. Love, Knowledge Ecology Notes, supra note 160.
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reward. 188 Further, according to Love, revisions to the Medical Innovation
Prize Fund Act of 2007 are being contemplated which would stipulate that
one percent of the total prize fund be allocated to "the researchers whose
and databases contributed the most to the products
open-source publications
' 189
worked."
actually
that
Other examples are the Barbados and Bolivia prize fund proposals that
offer "incentives for collaboration and access to knowledge" by allocating
prizes based upon open source contributions.19 0 For example, the allocation
of the Barbados and Bolivia Proposal 3, "Priority Medicines and Vaccines
Prize Fund," would be structured as follows:
The winning entrant would get 90 percent of the prize money. The
remaining 10 percent of the prize money would be given to unaffiliated
and uncompensated (by the winning entrant) scientists and engineers that
openly published and shared research, data materials and technology, in
the basis of who provided the most useful external contributions to
achieving the end result. This would include research, data, materials
in the public domain, or subject to
and technology that were either placed
19
open, non-remunerated licenses. 1
Similar provisions were proposed for the Barbados and Bolivia Proposal
1, "Prize Fund192for Development of Low-Cost Rapid Diagnostic Test for
Tuberculosis."'
In April 2009, the governments of Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname and
Bangladesh submitted a proposal, "A Prize Fund to Support Innovation and
Access for Donor Supported Markets," based on the proposals offered by
the governments of Barbados and Bolivia in the April 2008 WHO IGWG
This proposal combined the use of prizes to reward
meeting. 193

188.

Singh, supra note 95, at 201.

189.

JAMES LOVE, THE ROLE OF PRIZES IN DEVELOPING LOW-COST, POINT-OF-CARE

RAPID DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND BETTER DRUGS FOR TUBERCULOSIS (2008), available at

http://www.keionlieorgmisc-docs/Przes/prize tbmsfexpert meeting.pdf.
190. See Barbados & Bolivia Submissions to WHO IGWG, Working Document Barbados and Bolivia: Proposal 3: Priority Medicines and Vaccines Prize Fund (PMV/pf)
(Apr. 2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b igwg/prop3jmvpf.pdf [hereinafter
Proposal 3]; Barbados & Bolivia Submissions to WHO IGWG, Working Document Barbados and Bolivia: Proposal 1: Prize Fund for Development of Low-Cost Rapid
Diagnostic Test for Tuberculosis (Apr. 2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/b-b-igwg/
prop ltb_prize.pdf [hereinafter Proposal 1].
191. Proposal 3, supra note 190.
192. Proposal 1, supra note 190.
193. Proposal by Barbados, Bolivia, Suriname, and Bangladesh, A Prize Fund to
Support Innovation and Access for Donor Supported Markets, Linking Rewards for
Innovation to the Competitive Supply of Products for HIV-AIDS, TB, Malaria and Other
Diseases for Humanitarian Uses 1, 1 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.who.int/phi/
BangladeshBarbadosBoliviaSurinameDonorPrize.pdf.
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participation in a qualified, voluntary patent pool 194 and prizes to reward
openly sharing critical information. 95 The governments called the latter
prize "The Openness Dividend," and stipulated that five percent of the prize
fund be set aside "to reward parties that openly share the knowledge,
of the development
materials and technology that was critical to the success
196
money."'
prize
the
for
qualify
that
of the products
Unlike open source initiatives, patent pools, and prizes, the final strategy
this comment addresses, transferable intellectual property rights or wild
card patent extensions, was not endorsed in the WHO's Global Strategy.
Rather, this proposal has been suggested by such groups as the Infectious
Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) and is presented
as a contrasting model that leverages the patent system to incentivize
research.
D. Wild CardPatentExtensions
Wild card patent extensions work by allowing a company developing a
new agent targeting a disease or drug-resistant pathogen that would
otherwise not have a high-profit margin to extend the patent term on a highprofit-making drug already within their active portfolio. 197 The term "wild
card" is used because the drug company can choose the particular drug to
which the patent extension is applied. 198 Wild card patent extensions could
be applied to a number of research activities to motivate private companies
to conduct important research in areas where they would otherwise be
unable to recoup the R&D costs.
Groups such as the IDSA have proposed wild card patent extensions as
incentives to stimulate critically needed antibiotic development by private
entities such as pharmaceutical companies.' 99 Infectious disease experts
have discussed the sky-rocketing incidence of life-threatening infections
caused by multi-drug resistant organisms, coupled with a dearth of
development of novel antibiotics by pharmaceutical companies.2 °°
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
197. See Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to Incentivize
Research and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 241 (2009); Henry I.
Miller, BadBugs, Few Drugs, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A16.
198. Dee Ann Divis, Bio War: Bioshield Wild-CardPatent Curbed,UNITED PRESS INT'L,
April 27, 2005, http:www.upi.com/ScienceNews/2005/04/27/BiowarBioshieldwildcardpatentcurbed/UPI-54431114656656/.
199. INFECTIOUS DISEASE SOC'Y OF AM. (IDSA), BAD BUGS, No DRUGS: As ANTIBIOTIC
R&D STAGNATES, A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREws 1, 3 (2004), available at
http://www.idsociety.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=5554.
200. See Brad Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance and Antibiotic Development, 8 LANCET

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/7

24

Weilbaecher: Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentive Innova
2009]

Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries

According to the IDSA, "[t]he potential crisis at hand is the result of a
marked decrease in industry R&D, government inaction, and the increasing
prevalence of resistant bacteria., 20 1 To combat this public health crisis, the
IDSA proposed legislative solutions that include wild card patent
extensions. 202 In a recent study published in Infection, Spellberg and
colleagues estimated the societal costs of wild-card patent extensions
compared to the savings gained from the availability of new antibiotics.20 3
The researchers found that a wild card patent extension implemented with
regard to one new antibiotic to treat multi-drug-resistant Pseudomonas
aeruginosa would be cost-neutral in the first ten years of approval of the
new antibiotic; however, the extension would result in $4.6 billion in
savings within twenty years of approval.20 4 The study thus concluded that
wild card patent extensions would be a cost-effective strategy to incentivize
development of needed anti-infective agents.20 5
Critics argue that wild card patent extensions would not only
inefficiently cross-subsidize antimicrobial research and development but
also would act as a more than $40 billion annual tax on common diseases
such as heart disease, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
asthma and depression. 0 6 Spellberg responded to such criticism by
pointing out that these cost calculations do not consider the possibility of
shorter-term patent extensions of six months as opposed to two years and
"do not account for the money priority antibiotics can save207society by
reducing the enormous costs of multidrug-resistant infections."
IFPMA, whose members include twenty-six leading international
companies and forty-four national and regional industry associations, 20 8 also
has proposed a "transferable market exclusivity" model.20 9 Under this
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 211, 211 (2008); George H. Talbot et al., Bad Bugs Need Drugs: An

Update on the Development Pipelinefrom the Antimicrobial Availability Task Forceof the
Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUs DISEASES, 657, 657 (2006);
Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline-Challenges,Costs, and Values, 351 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 523, 523 (2004).
201. IDSA,supra note 199, at 3.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Brad Spellberg et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent
Extension Legislation to Spur Critically Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167,
167 (2007).
204. Id. at 167, 170.
205. Id. at 167, 172.
206. Kevin Outterson, Julie Balch Samora & Karen Keller-Cuda, Will Longer
Antimicrobial PatentsImprove Global Public Health?, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUs DISEASES 559,
559, 561-62 (2007).
207. Spellberg, supra note 200, at 211.
208. International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations
(IFPMA), http://www.ifpma.org/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
209. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Meeting the Need for Treatment: The Initiatives:How Do

Published by LAW eCommons, 2009

25

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

model, a company would be granted patent extensions for products
marketed in developed countries, in exchange for conducting R&D on
neglected diseases to improve the supply of medicines. 2'0 Additionally,
GSK has suggested the use of wild card patent extensions internationally as
a means to stimulate research on diseases that affect the developing
world.2 1
In the United States, wild card patent extension legislation has been
highly controversial. 2t 2 Congress proposed this type of legislation in the
Project Bioshield II Act of 2005.213 The bill proposed modifications to
Project Bioshield I, which authorized "$5.6 billion over 10 years to
encourage pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to work with the
NIH [National Institutes of Health] to develop antidotes, vaccines and other
products to treat and protect against a number of potential biological
weapons." 21 4 The wild card patent extension provision within Bioshield II
would allow a company receiving FDA approval for a new agent targeting a
drug-resistant pathogen to extend the patent on a high-profit-making drug
already within their active portfolio. 2 5 The term of the extension could
range from a minimum of six months to a maximum of two years.21 6 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services would be granted discretion to set
the period of term extension based upon various factors, such as the nature
of the threat to public health, the difficulty and expense associated with the
development of the drug, and the impact of patent extension upon
consumers and healthcare providers.21 7
The bill spurred much controversy, and ultimately Congress rejected it.
The bill's sponsors, including Senators Orrin Hatch, Joseph Lieberman, and
Sam Brownback, argued that pharmaceutical companies would not invest in
You Stimulate Research and Development (R&D) for New Drugs, Vaccines and Diagnoses
for Which There Will Never Be a Lucrative Market?, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 346,
347 (2006), available at
http://www.who.intfbulletin/volumes/84/5/news3O5O6/en/
index.html.
210. Id.
211. Sarah Lueck, 'Bioshield' Drug-PatentPlan Draws Fire; Generics Makers Fight
Extending Exclusivity Protectionto Areas Outside Biodefense, WALL ST. J., April 1, 2005, at
A4.
212. See Miller, supra note 197; Lueck, supra note 211; Spellberg et al., supra note 203,
at 171.
213. Project BioShield 11 Act of 2005, S. 975, 109th Cong. § l(a) (2005); Joe
Pappalardo, Congress Poised to Act on Weak Bio-Preparedness,NAT'L DEF., Aug. 2005, at
40,41.
214. Stephen Albainy-Jenei, BioshieldBill Would Provide Drug Patent Term Extension,
PATENT BARISTAS, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2005/04/29/
bioshield-bill-would-provide-drug-patent-term-extension/; see also Pappalardo, supra note
213.
215. See Lueck, supra note 211.
216. See S.975 § 301(b)(4)(A)(iv).
217. See S.975 § 301(b)(4)(A)(ii).
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financially risky bioterrorism research without incentives such as wild card
patent extensions. 218
Insurance companies and generic drug makers
1 ,9
opposed extending patent terms for drugs unrelated to bioterrorism.
Kathleen Jaeger, president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
stated, "[t]he wildcard would destroy the generic industry. We would never
know which products might be protected by the branded maker, and so we
would lose the predictability we need to do our own research and
development into drugs coming off patent." 220 U.S. Congressman Henry
Waxman, one-half of the legislative team who created the historic HatchWaxman Act of 1984, spoke out against the wild card patent extension
provision in Bioshield II at the Generic Pharmaceutical Association in
2005:221

Under this provision, a company that developed a countermeasure would
have been entitled to a patent extension of up to 2 years on any drug or
other product the company markets, regardless of whether that product is
related to bioterrorism. In other words, if Pfizer developed and obtained
approval of a countermeasure, it could obtain a two-year patent extension
on Lipitor. With U.S. sales of $7.7 billion last year, a two-year patent
extension on Lipitor would be worth over $10 billion to Pfizer.... There
simply is no reasonable argument that a drug company
needs a windfall
222
of this magnitude to develop a countermeasure.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
also was not overtly supportive of Bioshield II, skeptical of assurances that
R&D on bioterrorist countermeasures would pay off.223 Rather, PhRMA

218. Marc Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Profit, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at A5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/08/06/AR2005080601164.html.
219. Senators Propose Patent Extensions to Spur Biodefense R&D, AAAS, Apr. 6,
2005, http://sippi.aaas.org/ipissues/updates/?resid=540.
220. Kaufman, supra note 218.
221.
Waxman Cries Foul over Proposed Legislation Favoring Big Pharma, DRUG
STORE NEWS, Mar. 21, 2005, at 20, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim3374/
is_4_27/ai n13490559/print. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, allows generic drugs to receive
FDA marketing approval by submitting bioequivalence studies as opposed to clinical trials
which are more costly and time consuming. Additionally, the Act grants additional market
exclusivity of up to five years to compensate for the time needed to develop the generic
drug. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note,
355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)).
222. Congressman Henry A. Waxman, Remarks at the Center for Business Intelligence,
5th Annual Forum on Generic Drugs 9 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at
http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/speech cbi1 1.1 7.05.pdf.
223. See Dee Ann Divis, BioWar: 'Wild Card' Patent in Bioshield 2?, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, Sept. 1, 2004, http://www.upi.com/ScienceNews/2004/09/01/BioWar-Wild-card-

Published by LAW eCommons, 2009

27

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 18

supported other incentives instead of wild card patent extensions, such as
liability protection or advance purchase commitments.2 24
Proponents of wild card patent extensions argue that patent-based
incentives on profitable products, such as "blockbuster" drugs, are needed
to encourage firms to develop potentially less profitable products.225 Critics
question the fairness of funding the development of unprofitable drugs
through increasing the cost of current medications needed by the ill by
delaying the entry of cheaper copies to the market.226 In fact, a recent
report indicates that IDSA is no longer aggressively pursuing adoption of
wild card patent extensions due to "the extreme controversy that has been
associated with this idea."2 27 While wild card patent extensions are unlikely
to receive global support from the WHO, since they are seen as "solving
one problem by creating another," 228 this proposition nonetheless offers an
alternative model that could be utilized with the current patent system.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no panacea for closing the 10/90 research gap and incentivizing
private and public entities to perform critically needed R&D in the absence
of clear financial incentives. The patent system that rewards R&D on
profit-making drugs by offering significant protections for the drug
developers may actually foreclose research for less profitable drugs
developed to treat diseases endemic in developing countries. Open source
initiatives, patent pools, and prizes represent innovative responses to the
current reality that the market fails economically disadvantaged people
suffering from neglected diseases in developing countries; these responses
are supported by the recent WHO May 2008 Global Strategy proposal.
Born out of an increased awareness of the limitations of intellectual
property rights to incentivize R&D for diseases endemic in developing
countries,22 9 the Global Strategy represents an endorsement of WHO
member-nations to try novel approaches to promote innovation for
patent-in-Bioshield-2/UPI-28861094089655/.
224. Senators Propose Patent Extensions to Spur Biodefense R&D, supra note, 219;
Lueck, supra note 211.
225. Lueck, supra note 211.
226. Id; see also Otto Cars et al., Innovatingfor Antibacterial Resistance, ESCMID
NEWS, 2-2007 at 22-23.
227. Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A Call to
Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 155, 161 (2008).
228. WHO, InnovationforDiseases,supra note 101, at 4.
229. Nicoletta Dentico, Implementing the WHO Global Strategy on Public Health,
Innovation & IP: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Squandered by Poor Implementation,
IQSENSATO IN Focus, Mar. 12, 2009, at 8, available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/
uploads/2007/10/in-focus-vol-3-nol .pdf.
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neglected diseases both inside and outside of the patent system. By
contrast, the WHO has not endorsed the final strategy addressed in this
paper, wild card patent extensions.
It is presented as a contrasting model
that leverages the patent system to incentivize private companies in
researching new drugs for diseases where the likelihood of profit is low.
Although none of the strategies proposed in the WHO Global Strategy in
and of themselves likely will solve the problem, a combination of these
solutions might spur critically needed R&D and help close the 10/90 gap.
For instance, prizes can work synergistically with either open source or
patent pool models to incentivize innovation. Since the current marketbased model of drug development offers great challenges in developing
drugs for essential medicines that are available to everyone at affordable
prices, the strategies proposed by the WHO represent a step in the right
direction.

230.

WHO, Innovationfor Diseases, supra note 101, at 4.
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